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The inspiration for this lecture came to me while reflecting on the results of a panel 
discussion I organized one year ago for the Italian periodical «Memoria e Ricerca». It 
concerned the relation between the nation and its regions in ten European states and 
brought up some interesting results.1 Especially, I was surprised by the high degree of 
convergence in the construction of a regional sense of belonging, and by the historical 
importance that was generally attributed to these regional feelings for the constitution 
of an imaginary “national whole”. This correspondence seems remarkable to me, giv-
en the well known differences in the political status of regions across Europe within 
the diverging frameworks of more federal or more centralized state organizations. 
Another remarkable point was that all reports agreed in identifying the region and its 
history as an important tool of current identity politics. In Europe, it seems, the re-
gions are presently living a kind of resurgence. 
 In the face of what resulted from the panel discussion, I was wondering to 
which extent the regional politics pursued by Brussels after 1989 tie up with these 
developments. That has become my first question for this lecture. It is pointing not so 
much at the economic aspects in a narrow sense, but rather at the consequences that 
regional politics - as embodied in the Maastricht Treaty - might have on identity poli-
tics. According to the Treaty of 1992, resources should increasingly be redistributed 
to European regions and other decentralized corporate bodies through a direct negoti-
ation process. To be successful in competition on such resources, regional elites need 
political backing, which they try to obtain by drawing from the symbolic arsenal of 
regional identity. This leads to my first hypothesis: in addition to the well known ef-
fects of globalization, EU-policies also contribute to the revival of the region. 
 My second question concerns the relation between current developments and 
long-term history: is there a link between the resurgence of regional identity politics 
after 1989 on the one hand, and the discourses on nation, region and Europe before 
1989 on the other? And if such a link exists, does it improve the possibilities of suc-
                                                 
* Keynote lecture to the European Doctorate Building on the Past Seminar, at Nobel-Museum, Stock-
holm, 14 June 2007; Italian version published as “Il risorgere delle regioni nel contesto dell’inte-
grazione europea. Sviluppi recenti e prospettiva storica”, in: L'intellettuale militante. Scritti per Mario 
Isnenghi, ed. by Giulia Albanese, Alessandro Casellato, Eva Cecchinato, Daniele Ceschin, and Simon 
Levis Sullam, Nuova Dimensione, Portogruaro 2008; I thank for the kind permission. 
1. “Regione e storia regionale in Europa. Antitesi o metafora della nazione?”, coordinated by Rolf 
Petri, Memoria e Ricerca 22 (2006), pp. 107-134. 
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cess of regional politics? I might anticipate that up to now, this question cannot be 
answered completely. In so far, there is no equivalent to the extensive literature exist-
ing on the history of regional, national and European discourses after 1789 for the 
period after 1989. However, considerable evidence leads me to the assumption that 
there is nothing really new about regional identity and Europe being produced, and 
that the resumption of traditional discourses enhances rather than hinders regional 
identity politics. As it is with the speculative trading of old and sometimes brackish 
wine, selling allegedly old identities seems to be a quite profitable deal for someone 
wants to increase his political capital. 
 
 
1. The “trialectics” of region, nation and Europe between 1789 and 1989  
 
I believe that the recent relative success of regional identity politics relates back to the 
persistence of mythical traditions and historical narratives on region, nation and Eu-
rope. Let me begin by recalling some crucial aspects of the relationship between those 
three levels in the period from 1789 to 1989, starting with the region and its relation 
to nation. I cannot hold forth here about the different concrete meanings of the word 
“region” in relation to the various European linguistic traditions, or about the efforts 
to reach an objective definition of what a “region” is. Nor there is enough room here 
to go into the manifold practical problems of the statistical comparability of European 
regions, or to reflect about the problem of a fair partition of target areas in structural 
funding politics. All these aspects are important and meaningful in other contexts, 
whereas in the present one “region” is just to be understood as an imagined or de-
picted smaller territorial unit of a bigger whole, either within administratively defined 
boarders like in the cases of départment, Land, county, eparphia, rayon, oblast and so 
on, or in connection with emotional and nostalgic spatial categories such as Heimat, 
paese, homeland, terruño, kraj. 
 According to Michael Keating’s definition, we are dealing with a cognitive re-
gional identity, which as a rule displays an emotional dimension and at the same time 
an instrumental character, and which thanks to these two elements constitutes a space 
of political and cultural action.2 Therefore, here the word “region” is not a matter of 
formal definition: for example, Scotland, which is considered a “country”, or Catalo-
nia, which even got recognition as a “nation”, for the purpose of our reflection are 
nevertheless to be understood as regions. What distinguishes a nation from a region? 
The difference does not so much lie in the principles of collective identification with 
a territory: the mechanisms of nation and region building are indeed almost the same. 
The difference lies in the outcome of these building processes. It lies in the presence 
or absence of a territorial foundation of political power and sovereignty, which is, 
however, a result of historical contingency, as could easily be shown by a quick-
motion of the border shifts on the European political map since 1789. Since then each 
                                                 
2. Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Territorial Restructuring and Political 
Change, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton 1998, p. 86. 
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of the changes of national borders was declared to be the definite and most natural 
one. Actually, not even today there is any reason to believe that the spatial borders of 
sovereignty are drawn once and for all.  
 Not surprisingly, the panel discussion on the relation between region and nation 
in Europe brought up a wide range of differences, from pronouncedly federal to mar-
kedly centralistic traditions. In some states politically strong regions seem to have 
found a satisfying balance in the play of powers and authorities, in others regions 
seek for more autonomy. In some there is an alternative regional nation building in 
process, in yet others each form of political regionalism was apparently overlaid by a 
strong national paradigm. Nonetheless, all of the ten authors agreed on the point that 
historically, as well as currently, the region delivers a metaphoric access to the imagi-
nation of a national community, and was therefore central to the process of nation 
building. Historical, literal, musical and folkloristic representations of the regional 
dimension could be found everywhere. They functioned as a means for the represen-
tation of national authenticity through the mechanism of the “internal Other”, as it is 
typical for all processes of identification.3 Definitely, the modern nation and its re-
gions needed each other, and needed each others otherness, to come into existence 
and develop.4 
 In analogy to the dialectical nature of the region-nation relationship, we find, on 
another level, what Gerard Delanty refers to as the dialectics of the national and Eu-
ropean identity.5 The universalistic claim asserted by the European ideology of the 
late 18th century was employed as transcendent grounding for national particularistic 
claims. Beyond all the differences, I don’t know indeed of any national movement or 
national ideology on this continent, and especially not any of the most extreme ones, 
which have renounced the invoking of Europe and the particular European character 
of the own nation. Europe as a discourse is certainly older than the nation in the sense 
of 1789. However, the contemporary Europe has been reconstructed as a modern 
space of communication and interaction precisely through this inner dialectics. Not 
only peace treaties and convergence can claim to take part in this historical construc-
tion, wars and conflicts also take part in it. This somewhat deeper rooted identifica-
tion with Europe is often neglected in favor of a more superficial analysis of the li-
mited political consensus that the European Union is presently gaining among its citi-
zens.6 This is why the political and ideological force of what is called “European 
                                                 
3. George Herbert Mead, “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness”, Journal of Philosophy 9 (1912), 
pp. 401-406; Francesco Remotti, Contro l’identità, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2001, p. 63.  
4. Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “Presentación”, in: Id. (ed.), La construcción de la identitad regional 
en Europa y España (siglos XIX y XX), issue of Ayer. Revista de Historia Contemporánea 64 (2006), 
n. 4, pp.11-17, here 14; cf. also Alon Confino, Lo local, una esencia de toda nación, l.c., pp. 19-31, 
here 25. 
5. Gerard Delanty, “Die Transformation nationaler Identität und die kulturelle Ambivalenz europäis-
cher Identität”, in: Reinhold Viehoff, Rien T. Segers (eds.), Kultur – Identität – Europa. Über die 
Schwierigkeiten und Möglichkeiten einer Konstruktion, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 267-
288, here 272. 
6. See Rolf Petri, “Europa? Ein Zitatensystem”, in: Comparativ 14/3 (2004), pp. 14-49, Id. “Gerarchie 
culturali e confini nazionali. Sulla legittimazione delle frontiere nell’Europa dei secoli XIX e XX”, in: 
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identity” seems to be often underestimated. It may be less explicit, and belong to what 
has been called “dormant collective identities”; however, it represents at least in my 
eyes an enormous political potential. 
 So we detect ambivalent, dialectical, and reciprocally legitimating relations be-
tween nation and Europe, as well as between region and nation. What about the rela-
tion between Europe and region? In view of today’s developments, and slogans such 
as “Europe of regions”, we should ask about the earlier relationship between region 
and Europe. The triumph of national discourses between 1789 and 1989 apparently 
made any direct relation between region and Europe impossible. Still, we must not 
forget the “aesthetic revolution”- as it was formulated by Anne-Marie Thiesse -, 
which in the 18th and 19th centuries co-established the revolutionary principles of the 
people’s sovereignty. Whatever has been said to us about good and bad models of 
nation, ethnocentric thinking versus democratic citizenship and so on, the fact is that 
the ethno-territorial and folkloristic redefinition of the national sovereign, and the 
reference to its alleged rooting in the space and continuity of “old Europe”, served in 
all, virtually all, cases as an important tool of transcendent legitimization. Within this 
process, especially the region and its folkloristic manifestations moved to be the im-
agined seat of national authenticity, of the Volksgeist and its being rooted in timeless 
space and nature. The discourse on the “hereditary regional settlements”, to which we 
owe also the highly ambiguous “right of national self-determination”, put the 
groundwork both for the so-called “personality of nation” and for its European and 
“civilizing mission”, to speak in the words of Herder and Condorcet.7 
 
 
2. The “Europe of Regions” after 1989: representations and reality 
 
Following this brief historical digression, let us come to the possible relationship be-
tween the recent resurgence of the region on the one hand, and the regional politics 
and structural intervention of the European Union on the other. The setting up of a 
Committee of the Regions is one of the major modifications to the institutional frame 
of EU-politics after 1989. Another is the increase and change in the assignment of 
resources to regions within the frame of the Structural and Cohesion Funds. Today 
they make up more or less 36% of EU spending. Such a large sum of money and a 
new institution with 317 seats also generate heightened expectations. The principle of 
subsidiarity, as it is embodied in the Maastricht Treaty, promises to take decision-
                                                                                                                                           
Confini. Costruzione, attraversamenti, rappresentazioni, ed. by Silvia Salvatici, Rubettino, Soverio 
Mannelli 2005, pp. 79-99. 
7. Anne-Marie Thiesse, La creazione delle identità nazionali in Europa, Il Mulino, Bologna 2003, pp. 
19-62; James Macpherson, Fragments of Ancient Poetry collected in the Highlands of Scotland and 
translated from the Galic or Erse Language, Hamilton & Balfour, Edinburgh 1760; Remarks on the 
history of Fingal, and other poems of Ossian translated by Mr. Macpherson, London 1762; Emmanuel 
Joseph de Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? [s.n.], [s.l.] 1789; Jean-Antoine de Caritat marquis de 
Condorcet, Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain. Ouvrage posthume, 
Agasse, Paris 1795; Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menscheit (1785-
1792), in: Herders sämmtliche Werke, vol. 14, Weidmann, Berlin 1909. 
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taking as near as possible to the citizen and a decision-making structure vertically as 
well as horizontally integrated between national, supranational and regional levels. 
There was much talk of a “Europe of regions”, and instead of just 35 lobby agencies 
ten years earlier, in 2000 there where 150 regional and local government offices lo-
cated at Brussels aiming to gain influence for their region on Council and Commis-
sion.8  
 However, if fifteen years after Maastricht one takes a look at the competences 
effectively transferred to the regions, the outcome is quite meager. Neither the nation-
states nor the supranational level appear to be willing to hand over real decision-
making power to the region. To a great extent the so called “third level” of multiple 
governance has remained an illusion.9 Instead of getting actively involved into deci-
sion processes, the region apparently has become more object than subject in EU poli-
tics. Seen from Brussels, it seems to represent - more than anything else - a useful 
arena in which “Europe” hopes to stage and popularize itself, and bridge its own con-
sensus gap with the assistance of the sympathy that most European citizens have for 
their own region.  
 Nevertheless, as I will try to show in the following pages, the mobilizing effect 
of EU-politics and EU-rhetoric on the region remains remarkably strong, in spite of 
widespread disillusionment. Of course, this effect is also sustained by the tendencies 
of regionalization we experience in the context of globalization. In other parts of the 
globe the integration of markets and the dissolution of geographical limits to produc-
tion and distribution is accompanied by an only apparently paradoxical strengthening 
of territorially based systems of action. This applies to industrial districts and cluster 
economies, as well as to the growing role that political and cultural peculiarities on 
the regional or local level play for the global competition on markets, investment, 
locations. Regionalization and re-ethnification are side-effects of that process that can 
be observed worldwide.10 
The politics of the European Union, which is one of the most important play-
ers in the global economy, are so deeply embedded in these processes, that in the 
words of Huri Türsan one might say: «in Europe „globalization“ is replaced by the 
visions of „Europeanization“».11 Both in the end tend to undermine the competences 
                                                 
8. Francesco Boccia, Robert Leopardi, Enrico Letta, Tiziano Treu, I mezzogiorni d’Europa. Verso la 
riforma dei Fondi strutturali, Il Mulino, Bologna 2003, pp. 9-35; José M. Magone, Regional Institu-
tions and Governance in the European Union, Praeger, Westport 2003, pp. 1-23; Robert Leonardi, 
Shari Garmise, “Las elites subnacionales y la Comunidad Europea”, in: Manuel Arenilla Sáez, John 
Loughlin, Theo A. J. Toonen (eds.), La Europa de las regions. Una perspective intergubernamental, 
Universidad de Granada, Granada 1994, pp. 63-94. 
9. Anwen Elias, Europeanising the Nation. Minority nationalist partiy responses to European integra-
tion in Wales, Galicia and Corsica, PhD-Thesis, European University Institute, Florence 2006, pp. 13-
14. 
10. Marie-Claude Smouts, “The region as the new imagined community?”, in: Patrik Le Galès, Chris-
tian Lequesne (eds.), Regions in Europe, Routledge, London-New York 1998, pp. 30-38; Keating, The 
New Regionalism, pp. 73-76. 
11. Huri Türsan, “Introduction. Ethnoregionalist parties as ethnic entrepreneurs”, in: Lieven De Win-
ter, Huri Türsan (eds.), Regionalist parties in Western Europe, Routledge, London-New York 1998, 
pp. 1-16, here 4. 
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and regulative power of the nation-state. For this reason alone they represent, as An-
wen Elias argues, an «opportunity structure» for regional elites. Accordingly, it is 
impossible to separate precisely the contribution of EU politics to regionalization 
from other causes. In fact, looking at Russia and Norway, two important European 
countries free from the direct institutional impact of EU politics, one will notice that, 
despite all differences, the process of regionalization has taken place there as well, 
through the balancing out and redistribution of power, and the arising of regional par-
liaments and elected authorities which draw their legitimization “from below”. These 
new authorities link up in a symbolic way with alleged or actual regional traditions in 
order to give a new foundation to regional and partly ethnical identities, what gives 
them a better position in competition on resources with other regional and the central 
state authorities.12 
 These tendencies observed outside the Union could be interpreted as a sign 
against the specific contribution of the EU regional politics to the resurgence of the 
region within the Union – but only on the condition that both the mentioned countries 
were completely unaffected by the Union’s action. Instead, the economic giant EU is 
a powerful factor of influence for the whole European region. For example, it was 
with the help of the Euro-Regions that the Union intervened decisively in the making 
of the so-called Wider Northern Europe. The establishment of the Council of the Bal-
tic Sea States in 1992 was achieved mainly by encouraging an unobtrusive foreign 
policy of the coastal regions towards the former communist areas. In this case the EU 
acted both as a model for regional politics and as a political player, creating a regional 
mosaic in which - as Pami Aalto puts it - «the cultural boundary between the assumed 
Europeans and non-Europeans can be constructed in a gradated and open-ended 
form».13 
 Leaving the North and looking also elsewhere across the continent it becomes 
obvious enough how the input from Brussels pushes forward the process of regionali-
zation. This becomes particularly clear in the case of strongly national and centralistic 
states such as Ireland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Greece or Poland. Initially, in all 
these countries there was hardly any serious regionalist pressure from below. Decen-
tralization was partly initiated by the national political class itself, in order to streng-
then the regions, if only for reasons of national interest in the context of European 
funding politics. This process was and still is constantly accompanied by the effort to 
go back to traditional symbolism of regional identity, to make it politically and eco-
nomically exploitable, and sometimes to legitimate the regional discourse by intro-
ducing direct election of regional authorities.14 As soon as social, economic and cul-
                                                 
12. Oddbjørn Bukve, “Towards a new regionalism in Norway?”, in: Iwona Sagan, Henrik Halkier 
(eds.), Regionalism Contested. Institution, Society and Governance, Ashgate, Burlington 2005, pp. 
123-140; Sergej S. Artobolevskij, Regional Policy in Europe, Kingsley Publishers, London 1997, p. 
130; Hartmut R. Peter, “Russia”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, op.cit., pp. 128-130. 
13. Pami Aalto, European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe, Routledge, London-
New York 2006, p. 24. 
14. Miloš Rezník, “Repubblica ceca”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, op.cit., pp. 126-127; 
Anastasia Stouraiti, “Grecia”, in: l.c., pp. 121-124; Michael G. Müller, “Polonia”, in: l.c., pp. S. 124-
128; Panayiotis Getimis, Leeda Demetropoulou, “Europeanisation towards new forms of regional 
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tural interests become effectively integrated and associated on this level, region-
building has the potential to become a self-fertilizing process. 
 On the whole, the specific impulses provoked by EU regional politics seem to 
be weakest in countries with traditionally well established federal constitution and 
practices as Germany and Austria. And in countries such as Italy, where regional 
competences have been strengthened more recently, but where the routine of suprana-
tional funding of underdeveloped regions goes back to the early days of the European 
Economic Community, the additional mobilization effect provoked by EU regional 
policy appears to be modest. In a de-facto confederation on ethnic basis like Belgium, 
the allocation of EU resources to the regions seems even - somewhat paradoxically - 
to strengthen the bond between regions otherwise drifting apart. In some of these cas-
es, the negotiation concerning the distribution of competences and resources has 
come to be an administrational routine, rather than an object of public political de-
bate.15  
 It was shown in a comparison between analogous decision processes in Germa-
ny and France how in France region-building is receiving a stronger impulse from 
Brussels, resulting from the publicly transparent discussion, and sometimes quarrel, 
about allocations and competences. In France the regions are still kept on a short 
leash by the central government, but nevertheless find a way of expressing them-
selves on the political scene, and of representing their interests, if not always in prac-
tice, at least on the discursive level. In Germany, there was at most a short-lived de-
bate on regional interests and identity in the context of the discussions concerning the 
new definition of target areas and the extension of the EU towards the east. Except for 
this short-lived dispute, regional lobbying, and negotiation of resources with the fed-
eral level and Brussels, albeit often quite successful, are however routines which 
widely escape from the attention of the broader audience.16 
 The idea of a “Europe of Regions” was a strong impulse in such countries with 
regional movements or national minorities already struggling for long time to gain 
more autonomy, such as in Spain or Great Britain. Regions with a markedly “nation-
al” self-conception, like Scotland or Catalonia, have without any doubt been streng-
thened by the principles of subsidiarity and regional politics. At the same time, in the 
“Europe of regions”, they were offered an alternative solution for the endeavor for 
                                                                                                                                           
governance in Greece”, in: Iwona Sagan, Henrik Halkier (eds.), Regionalism Contested. Institution, 
Society and Governance, Ashgate, Burlington 2005, pp. 141-162; Andrzej Kowalczyk, “Die polnische 
Staatstrukturreform – ein nicht abgeschlossener Prozess”, in: Udo Bullmann (ed.), Die Politik der 
dritten Ebene, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 331-339; Susanne Benzler, “Transformation als Dauer-
zustand? Die Entwicklung der territorialen Selbstverwaltung in Polen”, in: l.c., pp. 310-330; Boccia, 
Leonardi, Letta, Treu, I mezzogiorni d’Europa, op.cit., p. 28. 
15. Artobolevskij, Regional Policy, pp. 106-107; Türsan, Introduction, p. 10; Boccia, Leonardi, Letta, 
Treu, I mezzogiorni d’Europa, pp. 26-27. 
16. Katrin Auel, Regionalisierters Europa – Demokratisches Europa? Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel 
der europäischen Strukturpolitik, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003; see furthermore Jörg Mathias, Regional 
Interests in Europe. Wales and Saxony as Modern Regions, Cass, London-Portland 2004; Thomas 
Serrier, “Francia”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, op.cit., pp. 113-116; and Matthias Me-
senhöller, “Germania”, l.c., pp. 116-118. 
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independence, which again facilitated the nation-states in making substantial conces-
sions.17  
 However, this balance is open to various future developments. I don’t believe 
that Alex Salmond’s recent statement, according to which the «spirit of independence 
is already out of the bottle»,18 should be taken as a realistic analysis of the present 
situation. On the other hand, the leader of the Scottish National Party may be right 
when indicating a potential situation, the possibility of success of which can only be 
shown by the future. One must state at least that the European integration has re-
moved some important structural obstacles from the way of regional nation-building 
processes as in Scotland, Catalonia or Southern Tyrol.19 In the former Europe domi-
nated by great national powers, the separation of regions and their re-constitution as 
small sovereign nations was rejected by a majority of inhabitants because they feared 
heavy welfare losses. Today, by contrast, the European Union offers an institutional 
frame which makes the economic survival and prosperity of smaller nation-states 
possible. Independence has become again something which is conceivable at least 
from the point of view of the economy. In some richer European regions, therefore, 
the expectation of welfare gains has recently worked out to be a magnificent catalyst 
of autonomist and separatist claims.  
  What has been said about autonomy and independence movements, also applies 
to new movements of regionally forming minorities, as well as to the regionalist poli-
tics of old-established parties. In each case, the legitimization of regionalist efforts 
and demands is increasingly obtained by drawing from the arsenal of ethnic patterns 
for identification. It must be said that the European Union and related supranational 
organizations also offer their own contribution to these developments. I refer, for ex-
ample, to the protection of cultural variety and regional diversity as laid down in the 
Amsterdam Treaty; I would also refer to the activities performed by the European 
Office for Minority Languages; and to the recommended adoption of the ILO Con-
vention 169 for the preservation of indigenous peoples’ culture, and so on, which all 
offer cultural and political backing for similar claims. 
 This might be exemplified by looking at the case of Sweden, a country with a 
long centralistic tradition and recent cautious tendencies towards regionalization. Fol-
lowing the example of the Sami, the Finnish speaking minority, which fights for rec-
ognition as indigenous inhabitants of some of the Northern regions, developed a 
                                                 
17. Kathryn Beresford, “Gran Bretagna”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, pp. 118-121; Xosé 
M. Nuñez Seixas, Spagna, l.c., pp. 130-133; Francesc Morata Tierra, “El estado de las autonomìas y 
las estrategias regionales en la Europa de los 90”, in: Manuel Arenilla Sáez, John Loughlin , Theo A. J. 
Toonen (ed.), La Europa de las regions. Una perspective intergubernamental, Universidad de Grana-
da, Granada 1994, S. 149-171; Pieter van Houten, Regional assertiveness in Western Europe. Political 
constraints and the role of party competition, PhD-Thesis, University of Chicago 2000; Jörg Mathias, 
Regional Interests in Europe, p. 75. 
18. Guido Santevecchi, “La Scozia sogna ancora l’indipendenza”, Corriere della Sera, April 30th, 
2007, pp. 16-17. 
19. Hans Heiss, “Fortschritt und Grenzen des Regionalismus. Südtirol nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg”, 
in: Michael G. Müller, Rolf Petri (eds.), Die Nationalisierung von Grenzen. Zur Konstruktion nationa-
ler Identität in sprachlich gemischten Grenzregionen, Herder-Institut, Marburg 2002, pp. 199-229. 
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strong regionalist discourse which, at least according to several analyses, influenced 
the regional and national self-understanding in the rest of Sweden.20 My argument is 
more drastically exemplified by the fact that the protection of ethnical minorities was 
made a prerequisite for the admission of new members by the EU. In Bulgaria, for 
example, this condition, in combination with the democratization of the oblasti, led to 
a new territorial distribution of power with ethnical connotations, since the strong 
Turkish minority makes up the majority of voters in four regions. On the other side, 
these circumstances gave a lift to the anti-Turkish movement ATAK. As a result, both 
ethnification and regionalization of Bulgarian politics have been boosted.21 
 Another interesting phenomenon can be observed in France, where the region 
not only receives an affirmative impulse from the EU, as is proved by the carefully 
initialized decentralization process. Further impulses are provided by a negative in-
terpretation and opposition to the European Union, according to which the region 
represents an area where to withdraw from the crisis of the national welfare state and 
the dangers of the mondialisation, with the EU seen as its henchman.22 
 Even if I cannot elaborate here all these elements in detail, I think they are sig-
nificant enough for the contribution of EU politics to regionalization. The role of EU 
politics is not precisely measurable, but at least verifiable: it did not lead to a new 
distribution of substantial competences in favor of the region, but to a clear streng-
thening of the region as projection surface and arena of economic, political and cul-
tural action, paving the way for potential redistributions of power in future. That said, 
its integrative or disintegrative effects of course cannot be foreseen. They are subject 
to historical contingency. 
 
 
3. Historical myths of the contemporary European regionalism 
 
In the last part of my paper, I shall try to bring the long-term historical perspective 
and the recent developments together. How can we interpret the prospects of regiona-
lization after 1989 in the light of the historical discourses about nation, region and 
Europe? Various studies in political science concerning regionalist, separatist and 
independence movements in Europe correspond in their result that the relation of 
these movements to Europe recently underwent important changes. Even those who 
where skeptical or openly rejecting the European integration process even in the 
1970s, in the following years switched over to a sometimes opportunistic, and other 
times genuinely enthusiastic, approval. The feeling of regionalist politicians both of 
old-established and new ethno-regional parties is that the EU has considerably loo-
                                                 
20. Lars Elenius, “Svezia”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, op.cit., pp. 133-134; Ingemar 
Elander, Stig Montin, “European integration, regionalism and local self-government in Sweden”, in: 
Bullman, Die Politik der dritten Ebene, op.cit., pp. 281-309; Sven Hassler, The health condition in the 
Sami population of Sweden, Medical Dissertations, New Series 962, Umeå University, 2005, p. 6. 
21. Marijana Jakimova, “Bulgaria”, in: Regione e storia regionale in Europa, op.cit., pp. 111-113. 
22. Anne-Marie Thiesse, “Centralismo estatal y nacionalismo regionalizado. Las paradojas del caso 
francés”, in: Seixas, La construcción de la identitad regional, op.cit., pp. 33-64. 
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sened restrictions on their political action, leaving them much more room.23 In face of 
what we have said previously, this result is not surprising. Unfortunately, the analyses 
of political science concentrate on the fact in itself that regionalist politicians now 
talk positively about Europe. They have paid little attention so far to what these poli-
ticians concretely are saying about Europe.  
  Still, in order to evaluate whether it is a continuity or a break, as well as the 
prospects of success for the ongoing regionalization, I believe that it is of interest to 
find out whether discourses on Europe and regional identity follow exclusively eco-
nomic advantage and other functional or opportunistic considerations, as it would 
appear to be the case reading the political science studies24; or whether they draw also 
from a canon of emotions, symbols and interpretations more than 200 years old. If we 
look for example at the rhetoric structure of the “Making of a Wider Northern Eu-
rope”, in the course of which particularly Baltic coastal regions functioned as Euro-
pean ambassadors for future member states, we will notice the evoking of several 
historical narratives. They followed the principle that - after the parenthesis of com-
munism – what belonged together since the ancient times of the Vikings, Novgorod 
or the Hanseatic League, should be finally reunited.25 
 The old narrative frame of unity within diversity, interpreted as typical Euro-
pean characteristic26, is very popular also in the context of regionalization and region-
al movements. As already mentioned, analyzing the concrete discursive practices 
within this frame still is, first of all, a desideratum for further research. According to 
what we know about the ideas that – to say it with a German metaphor for the «Gloc-
al» - regional politicians in lederhosen write on their laptops, it seems that even the 
former left-wing and grass-root opposition against environment damages and cultural 
leveling effects of globalization, which are also seen as a threat to regional authentici-
ty, has now found back to its discursive roots. These roots are at best represented 
through a neo-communitarian and ecological interpretation of the European “unity-in-
diversity” figure. As Antonio Pasinato put it, thanks to this homecoming - I quote - 
«the conditions are maturing for an approach to Heimat that is in harmony with the 
process of European unification».27 
 Relating to Old-Europe, to its tribes and natural landscapes, to its unity within 
the pre-Latin variety, remains a cultural background and political program for many 
regionalist movements. It is said that many of them still are of no great influence. It is 
                                                 
23. Waldemar Lilli, “Zur Bedeutung nationaler und regionaler Identität in der Vorbereitung europäis-
cher Integrationspolitik”, in: Thomas Conzelmann, Michèle Knodt (eds.), Regionales Europa – Eu-
ropäisierte Regionen, Campus, Frankfurt-New York 2002, pp. 238-254; Keating, The New Regional-
ism, op.cit., p. 87; Elias, Europeanising the Nation, op.cit., pp. 14-33 e 242-270. 
24. Thomas Christiansen, “Plaid Cymru: dilemmas and ambiguities of Welsh regional nationalism”, in: 
De Winter, Türsan, Regionalist parties, op.cit., pp. 125-142, here 133-135; Anton Holzer, Barbara 
Schwelger, The Südtiroler Volkspartei: a hegemonic ethnoregionalist party, l.c., pp. 158-173, here 
165. 
25. Aalto, European Union, cit, pp. 24-27. 
26. Petri, Europa?, op.cit., pp. 33-34. 
27. Atonio Pasinato, “Introduzione”, in: Id. (ed.), Heimat. Identità regionali nel processo storico, Don-
zelli, Roma 2000, pp. 3-12, here 9. 
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also said that what is pronounced by a regional leader at a political event or a meeting 
with his voters should not be taken too seriously. I think, that on the contrary we 
should ask why those politicians have reason to believe that people could be mobi-
lized by Celtic music festivals, parades in medieval robes and the like. The regional 
movements of the 21st century do not invent from scratch similar symbolic elements. 
They rather make use of them, because they turn out to be wide-spread and seemingly 
belonging to what has been called «dormant identities».28 Such constructions mature 
over very long periods, and offer a political potential that would be unwise to unde-
restimate. Regionalist movements contribute to re-activate these elements. Thus their 
impact, I believe, goes far beyond the number of electoral votes. For example, in their 
political action, the regionalist and separatist movements in wealthy Northern Italy 
gave special emphasis to the economic and anti-fiscal resentment.29 However, in the 
background there has always been a historical and ethnical construct with changing 
references: sometimes it relates to the Lega lombarda of the 12th century, other times 
to the civilizing and racially improving effects of the Lombard invasions (as already 
affirmed, among the others, by the nineteenth-century writer Giandomenico Romag-
nosi30), yet another time to the always unavoidable Celts, or even to “the thousands of 
years old Nation of the Venetians”.31 Superficially most Italians do not take these 
discourses too seriously. Nevertheless, the majority has come to accept the colloquial 
establishment of an ethnical and historical construct called Padania on the mental 
map of Italy. In this way, the mere word – even if it isn’t yet connected to material 
facts – can create room for changes in the future - just as it had been the case also for 
many region and nation-building processes of the past.  
 In spite of the gaps in research, I think that it is at least provisionally possible to 
recognize that the symbolism of postmodern regionalization mainly reactivates the 
modern ideologies of an ethnical and historical substrate of Europe, which in turn 
claims to refer back to pre-modern or even to prehistoric times, and to nature.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Since 1789 “Europe”, “nation” and “region” are levels of identification with a mutual 
relationship, conditioning and legitimating each other. The concept of nation is histor-
ically dominant, but on this continent never existed without the other two levels. This 
might be the reason why - despite being partially put into perspective by globaliza-
                                                 
28. Keating, The New Regionalism, op.cit., p. 87. 
29. Türsan, Introduction, op.cit. p. 10. 
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tion, European integration and regionalization - the nation has so far not displayed 
serious symptoms of disintegration. 
 The nation has indeed an ideological anchorage in the idea of Europe that is 
frequently underestimated. However, the recourse to the notion of Europe was prac-
ticed not only in the context of nation, European ideas have been picked up also with-
in regional discourse. Apparently, the symbolic and mythological horn of plenty is 
more abundantly filled than would be assumed by some fellow citizens worried about 
the unity and stability of the European Union. However, its contents seem to refer less 
to contemporary political institutions and mechanisms of the social and economic 
integration processes, than to mythical and historical elements of a long-term identity 
construction. This is one of the reasons, I believe, why it is so difficult to foresee and 
definitely describe the final direction that will be taken by the regions’ discourse 
about Europe, as well as by Europe’s discourse about the regions. As it already was in 
1789 or even in 1648, the territorial basis for political sovereignty in Europe still to-
day remains transitory, and thus an object of permanent negotiation. There is little 
reason to assume that this will change within the next fifty or hundred years. The re-
servoir of identity politics, containing symbols and memories, is ambiguous enough 
to potentially stay open both for the possibility of an extended integration and for 
disintegration tendencies. 
 On the one hand, the recourse to ethnicity moves the scenario of a virulent con-
flict between radicalized regionalist movements and likewise radicalized nation states 
into the realm of the theoretically conceivable. A similar scenario would probably 
undermine the supranational level of European institutions as well. On the other hand, 
resulting from the historical interlocking of the nation as well as the region with the 
ethnical and mythical discourses on Europe, the European Union has at its disposal a 
political potential of legitimization that should not be underrated. Although I would 
personally be less than enthusiastic about this alternative as well, I should admit that 
it could possibly back up ideologically a new balance of power, in which there is, at 
the end, actually more room for horizontally as well as vertically intertwined decision 
making processes of regions, nations, and Europe. 
